Interaction and identity formation 4 process in self-categorization (e.g., Antaki, Condor, & Levine, 1996; Billig, 1987) . This is partly (a) because self-categorization depends on social consensus, (b) because interaction is pivotal to the mutual formation of personal and social identity in relation to each other, and (c) because interaction informs the content of those identities.
Before elaborating this argument, however, we need to devote some more attention to the idea that individuality plays a role even in social movements. The quotation at the start of this chapter makes a distinction between vertical and horizontal influences on (Islamic fundamentalist) identity. The vertical influence is that of heritage, it assumes a firmly established social identity which exists independently (and outside) of the self. Yet, as Maalouf (2000) argues, despite the strong claims of Islamic fundamentalists to tradition and historical consistency, it is very much a new phenomenon, a social identity "under construction." Like Maalouf, we believe that the construction of social identities is, partly, a horizontal or bottom-up process in which individuality plays a key role.
In order to address these issues of identity formation in small groups and social movements, the first part of the chapter explores whether there are any fundamental differences between groups in which individuality appears to be more or less visible. The second part of the chapter then examines SCT and its ability to account for phenomena in small and large groups alike. The final part of the chapter turns to the question of how social identities and personal identities are formed through interaction.
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Distinguishing different group types: Interactive groups and social categories
Typologies of "the group" are popular in social psychology today. These typologies bear witness to an impressive variety of human forms of aggregation.
People can identify meaningful groupings in culture, language, nation, race, wealth, age, religion, gender, organization, sports, city, village, sexuality, neighbourhood, friendship, family, and even the size of ears. Human groupings may vary in terms of their sense of common fate, clarity of goal or purpose, size, degree of interaction, group composition, and so on. Typologies have attempted to impose some structure on this variety by identifying kinds. Lickel et al. (2000) , for example, differentiated between intimacy groups (family and friends), task groups (teams at work), social categories (race, gender), and loose associations (neighbourhoods, people with similar interests). Along different lines, Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Ethier (1995) proposed five types of identities: those based on relationship, vocation/avocation, stigma, political affiliation, and ethnicity/nationality.
The relevance of these typologies to the present volume lies in the clear distinction that runs through them between groups in which the individuality of members is central, and groups in which individuality is peripheral-that is, interactive vs. categorical groups (e.g., Deaux & Martin, 2003; Lewin, 1948; Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001; Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994; Wilder & Simon, 1998) . Elsewhere, we have referred to these as "interpersonal" groups, which are made up of an identifiable number of individuals, and "categorical"
Interaction and identity formation 6 groups in which individuals other than self are either absent, invisible or "expendable" (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, in press; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, in press ).
The obvious and useful question raised by such distinctions is whether general theories of the group (e.g., self-categorisation theory) are equally applicable to each type of group. Implicit in these typologies is an assumption that the kind of processes specified by SCT can only be found in categorical social groups and social movements (e.g., Islamic fundamentalism), and that they are less relevant to smaller interactive groups and intimacy groups within which individuality is centre-stage. This would suggest, of course, that whenever individuality raises its head, whether in small groups, interpersonal relations, or in the family, there can be no social movement or social categorical process (see also Fiske, 1993) . Margaret Thatcher seemed to subscribe to this view when she argued in 1987 that "there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families". So let us investigate the assumption that interpersonal and categorical groups are fundamentally different. Do we need different psychologies for different groups?
Group Typologies and Group Psychologies
What is perhaps most revealing about the variety of groups that play a role in our lives, is that they are all psychologically significant. Indeed, to use of the term "group" when referring to diverse forms of aggregation (a social movement such   Interaction and identity formation   7 as Islamic fundamentalism, a social category such as race, or small interactive teams in organizations) is not simply a terminological inaccuracy. On the contrary, it is an accurate reflection of the fact that, in the right circumstances, any one of a bewildering diversity of groupings can become psychologically relevant and consequential-influencing our understanding of the world and the way we act upon it through a powerful emotional significance attached to membership. In this respect, typologies are a helpful reminder of the variety of bases upon which humans may create the social reality of "groupness" (Campbell, 1958) .
The study of the formation of a psychological group (and social identity) should certainly take this variety into account. Indeed, we should acknowledge the flexibility of social organization as an essentially human ability. One can contrast this to studies of human groups from biological and evolutionary perspectives, which assume that human survival depends on small interactive face-to-face groups (Caporael, 2001, p. 255) . For example, to identify the "archetypal" social groupings that humans have evolved in and with, Dunbar (1993) infers from brain sizes of different species that the human mind can cope with groups up to about 150 members. This is inferred from the maximum number of concurrent inter-personal relations that we can juggle in our mind.
Slightly inconsistent with this, anthropological research suggest that the earliest human hunter-gatherer groups were probably family-dominated bands of about 20-60 people, but also note that "groups could fragment and coalesce to exploit diverse and variable resources" (Johnson & Earle, 2000, p. 87) . Whatever the preInteraction and identity formation 8 cise number, though, this kind of work would suggest that the human brain is evolutionarily prepared to cope with small interpersonal groups, not with more abstract social categories. This has led to suggestions that the flexibility of groupings and social organizations witnessed today (and throughout history, in fact) are an adaptation of stone-age minds to a modern world, with people "extending" small group characteristics to larger social categories (cf. Caporael, 2001, p. 255) .
From our perspective, the problem with such analyses is that they favour one conception of groups over others. They assume that groups must be a physical entity whose members meet regularly. As a result, they ignore the point that hunter-gatherer societies shared their language and customs not just with their family or band, but with at least several thousands (Johnson & Earle, 2000) .
In other words, some form of social categories almost certainly existed even then.
Moreover, it is not the size of groups or the prevalent form of interaction that ultimately matters, it is their psychological representation. Even a small band of hunter-gatherers may at times operate as an interpersonal networks of social support (e.g., when going on a joint hunting expedition), and at different times as a social category (e.g., when engaged in conflict with a neighbouring band or clan). The ubiquity and power of social categorisation processes today make it very unlikely that this is a modern adaptation. Indeed, far from being an abnormality, the flexibility of conceiving the same groups in terms of different forms of social organization seems to be a distinctively human capacity (see also Dupré, 2001 ).
Interaction and identity formation 9 However, to say that a capacity for flexible social organization is "normal" does not bring us any closer to explaining how humans manage to found shared (consensual) perceptions of meaningful social groups on such different associations. To explain this capacity for creating social structure is a fundamental challenge to social psychology. To some extent, typologies are helpful in making us realize the magnitude of this challenge. At the same time, however, typologies risk setting an agenda for group psychology that puts us on the wrong path.
Limitations of group typologies
There are at least three potential problems with typologies in general, and with the distinction between interpersonal and categorical groups in particular. First, typologies imply that there are different psychologies for different kinds of groups. The problem with this is that if there were clear differences between the characteristics of groups (see below for some caveats) this does not mean that the psychological consequences of group membership need be any different. The same sense of profound purpose and involvement that characterizes the crowd, for example, can also occur in newly assembled teams at work, or in an amateur choir. Of course, there might be variations in the intensity, generality, and duration of these psychological responses, but what should interest social psychologists is the potential for such fundamentally different social relations to evoke even proximately similar responses.
The second limitation of typologies is that they set an agenda by concentrating on social groupings that are ordinarily encountered in everyday middleInteraction and identity formation 10 class life (family, work groups, sport teams, religion, and so on). Part of the problem here is that the extraordinary cases (online communities, crowds, social movements) might be the most informative, for they most loudly and clearly contradict some established social psychological theories of groups. For example, consider the anti-globalisation protests in Seattle, Genoa, and elsewhere. The very possibility for a fragmented body of individuals and subgroups to coalesce into a crowd acting in unison, with all the psychological conviction of those who take part in its mass movement, raises thorny questions for group theories based on social exchange principles (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996) . The crowd phenomenon forces us to consider the flexible and dynamic nature of social organization in action (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996) . Similarly, the capacity for humans to find psychological meaning in virtual groups (e.g., for social support) challenges some of the physical conceptions of the group as grounded in physical presence or physical similarity (Postmes & Baym, 2005; Spears, Postmes, Lea, & Wolbert, 2002) . If we are serious about putting social psychological theory to the test, these extraordinary groups matter.
In contemporary group typologies the crowd or virtual community does not make an entry (cf. Lickel et al., 2001) . Indeed, this is ensured by the methodologies and samples of the studies validating them. If participants are asked what social groups they belong to, that question already favours permanent groups over transient ones such as the crowd. Moreover, if one asks this question to Midwestern university students, then the composition of that group can explain why race and gender are perceived as being of low "social identity value" Interaction and identity formation 11 (Lickel et al., 2000, p. 234) . Finally, it is likely that these participants do not realize just how important certain groups are to them-after all, the significance of being American, white or Christian only becomes apparent when one is exposed to a different culture. Typologies risk narrowing our understanding of the group by restricting the analysis to common and typical groups such as family and friends.
A final problem is with the validity of the characterization of types itself.
Any typology should meet two assumptions: one of homogeneity within types, and one of distinctiveness between types. In the case of group typologies, both assumptions are questionable. Reflecting on the homogeneity assumption, it is apparent that a social grouping assumes a different character across time and context. For example, at different occasions a family may operate as a network of personal relations, or as a categorical entity which gives its members a social identity that guides their behaviour (e.g., through the provision of group norms), and that of other people (e.g., through stereotyping). One does not need examples as extreme as the royal family, the mafia or the British National Party to appreciate this point-any social grouping can function both as a set of individuals and as a social category, depending on what its activities are, what other groups are involved, and what it is attempting to achieve. This contextual variability raises theoretical and practical doubts about the homogeneity of "types."
Further concerns can be raised about the distinctiveness assumption. There is a remarkable interdependence that cuts across boundaries between interactive and categorical groups. The writing on a postcard from Waco, Texas (1916) , may illustrate the point. The writer refers to the picture on the front: "this is the barbecue we had last night. My picture is to the left with a cross over it. Your son, Joe" (Allen, Als, Lewis, Litwack, & Litwack, 2000) . On its own this sounds like innocent family banter-love and affection at work, clearly a process found in interactive groups. But the picture of the front is not so innocent: it is a graphic photograph of a gruesome lynching, with a cross to identify one of the proud perpetrators. The nature of this "barbeque" reveals that this family's intimate personal relations are grounded in a shared social-categorical positioning that most people would consider racist and criminal today. Indeed, far from being divorced from social categories, the intimate relationships with family and friends are the primary context within which our understanding of categories are shaped and changed. Thus, it is not entirely obvious that the functions of, say, family and friendship groups can be understood separately from the social categories in which they are grounded, or vice versa.
The challenge for a psychology of groups, then, is not to carve up group life into neat little subdomains, each with their own set of processes and principles which structure human interaction. Rather, the challenge is to find one general theory from which we can better understand the human capacity for forming groups in a wide variety of ways. SCT aims to provide just such a theory.
Interpersonal Groups, Intragroup Dynamics and Self-Categorization Processes
Building on pioneering work by Henri Tajfel, SCT aimed to resolve the individual-group dualism (Turner, 1982; Turner & Oakes, 1986) . The purpose was to replace the idea that individuality (in here) and group (out there) are two separate forces with the idea that individuals internalize the group and may call on more personal or more social aspects of their own identity (Turner, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) . By incorporating the group within the individual, SCT is able to account for the fact that while humans are perpetually under the implicit or explicit influence of groups, they tend to experience this group behaviour as profoundly authentic and self-authored (i.e., as stemming from individuality). Moreover, because SCT conceives of the group as a psychological, not just a physical or sociological, entity, its ideas can be applied to any kind of social relationship which can be represented as a groupthe influence of social identity can therefore be found in anonymous dyads collaborating over the Internet (Tanis & Postmes, in press) as well as in the midst of the crowd (Reicher, 1984) .
Self-categorization in all groups great and small
From its inception, a core assumption of self-categorization theory has been that social identity processes are as central to the internal dynamics of small groups as of large social categories. Indeed, Tajfel (1978) observed that "the three aspects of group membership […] --the cognitive, the evaluative and the emotional-can be made to apply equally well to small groups and to large social categories" (p. 29). SCT was even more explicit about this (Turner, 1982 (Turner, , 1985 Turner et al., 1987) . In fact, its initial emphasis was on polarization in small groups as the testing ground for self-categorization theory's meta-theoretical assumptions (e.g., Turner et al., 1987, p. 88) . Thus, the theory has provided an ambitious agenda by proposing that it is capable of accounting for social influence as much in small groups as in any other (inter)group setting (Turner, 1991 ).
Yet, partially as a result of the persistent assumption that we need different psychologies for different groups, SCT's impact on small group research has remained partial, at best. Small group researchers themselves have suggested that SCT is more suited to explaining the way that (out)groups are perceived than the internal dynamics of groups (e.g., Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996) .
Similarly, a recent review of decision making and productivity research contrasted studies of small groups with "approaches popular in European social psychological circles with clear relevance to groups, but with a clear interpersonal (e.g., minority influence) or intergroup (e.g., social identity theory) focus." Somewhat cryptically, it added that "For those interested in intragroup processes, per se, this could be viewed as a half-empty glass" (Kerr & Tindale, 2004, p. 641 ).
As such comments indicate, self-categorization principles are typically seen as irrelevant to small group dynamics.
There is one obvious reason why the message of self-categorization theorists has failed to convince the audience of small group researchers. Some Interaction and identity formation 15 notable exceptions notwithstanding, research in the social identity tradition has traditionally eschewed the study of small interactive groups (Morton & Postmes, 2005) , instead focusing on minimal groups (i.e., without interaction) or perceptions of groups. This may have been part of a general move away from studying interaction in social psychology (Haslam & McGarty, 2001 ), but it has undoubtedly constrained the ability to provide empirical backing for SCT principles. Fortunately, there is a growing body of research that is starting to address this (Postmes et al., in press-a).
However, there are more fundamental factors that help explain why SCT's implications for small groups have been overlooked. One is that SCT has not sufficiently elaborated issues of individuality and diversity within the group, leading to the common misconception that social identity processes inevitably lead to the elimination of intra-group differences or the denial of individuality A second issue is that SCT makes a rigid distinction between personal and social identity (see also Turner et al., this volume) . Within SCT, the relation between personal and social identity is shaped by several assumptions. One is Interaction and identity formation 16 that social identity is a product of comparisons made in social context, with other comparable groups (driven by the principle of meta-contrast), whereas personal identity is a product of comparison with comparable individuals (Onorato & Turner, 2004; Turner & Onorato, 1999) . This is essentially a perceptual phenomenon related to the Gestalt principle that a salient figure invites contrast from the ground (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963 , 1964 . Another key assumption is that social and personal identity are functionally antagonistic, meaning that the salience of one will be at the expense of the other. Again this is related to the Gestalt principle that seeing an entity precludes seeing its constituent parts, and vice versa.
In conjunction, these two assumptions appear to imply that small group dynamics are governed by personal identity concerns.
2 This is (a) because in many small group studies there is no apparent or obvious outgroup (as in the case of an orchestra or theatre group, for example), group members' actions would have to be based largely on intra-group comparisons and personal identity. Moreover, (b) a strong interpretation of functional antagonism (or Tajfel's interpersonal-group continuum for that matter) implies that there could not be, within a small group, any obvious way of reconciling the acute inter-personal dynamics of interaction 2 Issues of functional antagonism have been the subject of considerable debate.
We do not have the space to review this literature here. Suffice to say that in its original conception, functional antagonism was much more nuanced than some subsequent interpretations suggest (see Turner et al., this volume) . This chapter is more concerned with identifying its positive uses than with disentangling past (mis)understandings.
Interaction and identity formation 17 between individual members with the concurrent salience of a superordinate sense of social identity (but see Haslam, 1997) .
The application of SCT to dynamics in interactive groups, then, appears to be obstructed by some of its own core assumptions. The resolution is not particularly complex, we argue, but it does require an elaboration of the key assumptions outlined above. This elaboration needs to address (a) the way in which personal and social identity are constituted or formed, both on their own and in relation to each other, and (b) the capacity for social interaction to transform social cognitive processes into shared cognitive ones.
The formation of social identity
Basic work in the social identity tradition has explored how social identity is grounded in inter-group comparisons and associated dynamics (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Reicher, 1996) . Framed by historical and ideological understandings, group members can deduce from these inter-group factors specific properties of social identity-what it means to be a member of this group at a particular junction. As an example, a perceived conflict with Israel and America exerts an undoubted influence on Islamic fundamentalism. In addition to these factors, however, we argue that the behaviour of individual group members (which may be dictated by social identity, but also by personal identity) will also exert an influence on the content of social identity (see also Reicher & Haslam, this volume) . People take note of individual actions by leaders (Khomeini, Arafat or Mahmoud Abbas) and they are in constant dialogue and debate with ordinary ingroup members in order to induce how group membership is to be interpreted and enacted (see Figure 1 , and also Postmes et al., in press-a, in-press-b; Turner, 1982) . This is the "horizontal" heritage referred to by Maalouf (2000) .
The implications of this line of thought are interesting. In particular, it follows that small group dynamics can, in their own right, give rise to the induction of group norms and other aspects of identity. It means that social identity processes are not restricted to categorical groups, but also occur in groups like an amateur choir or theatre company-groups that do not operate in the salient intergroup context that is so characteristic of Islamic fundamentalism.
It also implies that social identity processes are likely to have played a role in some of the classic social influence studies such as Sherif's (1935) research on norm formation in laboratory groups (see also Turner, 1991) .
Moreover, the power of these inductive processes also explains why group members who are driven by their own strategic and selfish concerns (bound up with personal identity) invest so much in attempting to shape ingroup norms. For Figure 1 : An Interactive Model of (Social) Identity Formation example, the success of neoconservatism in the US is partly the result of careful management of perceived intergroup relations and actual wars with "evil" empires (e.g., the USSR) and antagonists (e.g., Islamic fundamentalism). It is through the systematic highlighting of these outside threats that neoconservatives come to be perceived as prototypical of national social identity (cf. Reicher & Hopkins, 2001 ). However, the fact that representations of intergroup relations are the tools for achieving intra-group objectives does not distract from the conclusion that this, ultimately, is also a project of bottom-up social identity construction by individuals. The fact that personal identities can shape the construction of social identity suggests that the two are more closely connected than is often acknowledged.
The formation of personal identity
In addition to a botton-up process whereby individuals construct social identities, there is the reverse process: the formation of personal identity is also informed by aspects of social identity. As is the case for the outcome of any social comparison process, the feelings of distinctness that give rise to personal identity must, to some degree, be rooted in a contrast between self and comparable others (Onorato & Turner, 2004) Simon and colleagues have made a further point about the relationship between personal and social identity. They note that people differentiate themselves by constructing a self-image that integrates multiple elements drawn from the patchwork of social groups to which they belong (Kampmeier & Simon, 2001; Simon, 2004) . Thus, to be a feminist might be a distinctive feature in a group of men, but at a feminist conference one obvious source of distinctiveness would be the simple fact of being male. Although this may appear to be a cognitive process of self-construal, it can only be achieved if members of the overarching group sanction (or at least do not challenge) the results of this process. In that sense, the establishment of personal identity is strongly dependent on the group. What emerges from this is a much more organic model in which individuals construct personal identity by using social group memberships as a resource-a process which is no doubt partly motivated by the desire to seek positive differentiation from others and to establish a meaningful position for self within the group (cf. Pickett & Leonardelli, this volume), but which is also likely to be restricted by the kinds of individuality which are permitted by others in the group, and by the boundaries that norms and culture impose on this process of construal (cf. Moghaddam and Halloran & Kashima, this volume).
As our description of this process of normative guidance implies, we believe that there are also more direct (and profound) influences of social identity on personal identity (Baray, Postmes, & Jetten, 2005) . For even when personal identity is made salient within the group, people will necessarily take account of the content of social identity (see also Turner, this volume). In fact, we propose that membership of some groups may shape the personal identity of its members, both within the context of the group and outside it. This is particularly true where groups have an ideology, culture and/or philosophy that aims to inform the identity of its members in such a way that it permeates all social contexts, not merely those in which the group's social identity is explicitly made salient.
Religious groups are a good example of this. Although religion no doubt varies in salience from context to context, for "true believers" it cannot but pervade all aspects of their life. Thus, in the bible Jesus says "I am the way, the truth, the light" (John, 14:6), not "I am the way, the truth, the light, some of the time." The content of religion expressly aims to inform and regulate all ways of life. It delineates a set of norms, values, and beliefs whose validity and applicability is assumed and often claimed to be universal. Similar influences can also be exerted by one's culture. A sense of personal identity cannot but emerge from such social identities, and must be congruent with it (Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002) .
Recent research examined this proposal in a sample of members of the Turkish Nationalist Action Party (Baray et al., 2005) . This is an extreme rightwing party with a nationalist and Islamic agenda. Its unofficial militant arm, the "grey wolves," has a long history of violence and terrorist activities. More than Interaction and identity formation 22 other political parties, it provides an ideology for its followers that encompasses all aspects of their lives, regulating their social interactions with ingroup and outgroup others. Indeed, one of their nine key doctrines is about "character building" (Arikan, 2002) . In our research, we discovered that for members of this group, aspects of personal identity and social identity are not negatively correlated or independent of each other. In fact, when we attempted to make personal identity salient, and promote intragroup comparisons in members of these groups, they became more willing to let their individual identity and destiny be dictated by their group, and aspects of personal and social identity became strongly and positively associated.
Putting these perspectives on social and personal identity formation together, it would appear that in terms of the construction of identity content, there is an ongoing dynamic between personal and social identity. Moreover, this dynamic interaction between personal and social aspects of identity is not a purely cognitive process. As Marx (1857 Marx ( /1993 pointed out, it is because of "society" (Gesellschaft) that individuality exists. The original term Gesellschaft used by Marx refers not just to the state or Nation, but to a social process. Lost in translation is the point that individuality can only emerge in an enduring and cooperating social group whose members have developed organized patterns of relationships through interaction with one another (see also Durkheim, 1893 Durkheim, /1984 .
Personal identity and social identity in social interaction
The conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that social identity and personal identity cannot be constructed entirely independently from each other, and are in fact constrained and informed by each other in important ways. For social identity, the content is socially constructed in interaction: cognitive representations of ingroup stereotypes or social norms need to be grounded in a social consensus before they can be effective guides for ingroup behaviour (Haslam, 1997; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998) . Such social constructs inevitably depend on a system of social validation and social interaction to define and perpetuate them (Festinger, 1954; Searle, 1995) . In other words, it is because of social interaction that social identities become social realities that we can act upon, rather than mere cognitive and subjective representations of the group (Haslam, Postmes, & Ellemers, 2003; Stott & Drury, 2004 ).
For personal identity we find a similar process occurs. The degree to which one can successfully differentiate oneself from others (and express personal identity) is as dependent on the tacit consent of the audience as is one's claim to a social identity. In fact, there is a long tradition in social psychology which argues that there is no other way to know the self than through a process of actual and symbolic interaction with others (e.g., Mead, 1934) . Even the apparently private sense of personal identity therefore requires some social consensus that allows one to legitimately differentiate oneself from others on particular dimensions.
Thus, social consensus is pivotal to the successful enactment of personal and social identity in our social lives. There are several examples from our research which speak to this. Swaab and colleagues, for example, have conducted a series of studies examining negotiations between multiple parties (Postmes et al., in press-a; Swaab, Postmes, Neijens, Kiers, & Dumay, 2002; Swaab, Postmes, Spears, Van Beest, & Neijens, 2005) . The success of settlement in these negotiations was a direct function of the interaction within the groups. In a first phase of the experiment, a simple manipulation in which group members circulated information created a sense of shared cognition (e.g., Swaab et al., 2005, Study 1, 3, 4) . In the second phase, when group members sat down to negotiate a thorny issue, this shared cognition provided the basis for the emergence of a sense of social identity, which in turn was powerfully predictive of successful negotiation settlement. In some sense, this process of convergence of individual cognitions through communication is essentially a form of consensualization (Haslam, 1997) . Importantly, however, the manipulation itself only created an awareness among group members of each other's cognitions-in itself, it did not resolve any of the tensions or conflicts of interest.
Communication has also been shown to play a key role in the emergence of a sense of shared identity in computer-mediated groups (Postmes et al., in pressb; Sassenberg & Postmes, 2002) . These studies suggest that in groups that have a sense of shared identity to begin with (either because individuality is not visible, or because groups have been led to develop a shared identity from the outset) communication serves to reinforce the existing identity-with convergent and homogeneous communications predicting the establishment of a clear group norm and polarized group position (much as predicted by self-categorization theory). Communication appears to play a crucial role in social identity processes by translating an abstract common identity that could potentially unite the group, into a concrete shared identity that actually influences and guides their actions in relation to the task at hand.
Quite different communication processes take place when personal identity and interpersonal relations are salient from the start (Postmes et al., in press-b; Sassenberg & Postmes, 2002) . Here, too, a sense of social identity emerges over the course of interaction, but convergence on a common identity is achieved differently. Under these conditions it is the degree to which groups thoroughly talk through and negotiate the issues they face that predicts whether they succeed in complementing the interpersonal interactions with a superordinate sense of identity. This is direct evidence for a process of induction-the inference of commonalities from the broad range of perspectives expressed by individuals within the group-achieved through interaction.
This process of induction can be fragile in the sense that it may not always result in the establishment of a strong sense of social identity. Nevertheless, to the extent it does occur this has implications for functional antagonism. There may be antagonism at the level of the perceptual salience of personal vs. social identity as cognitive constructs (see Turner et al., 1987, pp. 49-50) , but the stream of individual actions within the group demands continuous reassessment. Each distinctive act raises a question: is it best assimilated into what counts as "group Interaction and identity formation 26 behaviour" or should it be contrasted as an idiosyncratic individual act? The very fact that social identity is at the same time a product of social consensus and a subjective representation of that consensus means that we can never be entirely sure what our ingroup stands for, and whether each person within our group is representative of it: social identity salience may stimulate the search for consensus within the group (Turner, 1991) , but it does not make us blind to intra-group heterogeneity. This is perhaps best illustrated by the crowd. Even when, in the heat of the moment, crowds act apparently single-mindedly, their members still display awareness of individuality-fulfilling individual roles, renegotiating their tactics with each other, and displaying individual initiative even to the point of policing their own actions (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott, Hutchison, & Drury, 2001 ). impossible (Hogg, 1996; Swann, Kwan, Polzer, & Milton, 2003) . This strong interpretation of functional antagonism can be illustrated with the well-known image of "Rubin's vase" (Figure 2 ). In this image, one can either see a vase or two faces, but not both at the same time-seeing one as figure relegates the other to ground. However, the dynamic interaction between individuals does not follow such perceptual laws. In the first instance this is because interaction is an ongoing process. Although at any specific moment it may be cognitively difficult or impossible to "see" figure and ground (personal and social identity), one only needs to take a slightly longer look at the figure to realize that figure and ground are there, and that they are dependent on each other. Moreover, interaction is based on language, and within language (unlike perception) it is possible to acknowledge both faces and vase. Finally, such an interpretation of functional antagonism assumes that personal and social identity exist as concrete cognitive entities that are equivalent and contrastable, but the notion that both are constituted through social interaction entails that they are ongoing social processes that may be more or less complementary or antagonistic.
Beyond these implications for SCT, it is clear from this research that social identity processes do play a role in interactive groups. Even in "personal" groups that have been deliberately constructed around interpersonal relations, the emergence of a social identity can be witnessed over time, just as social identity processes may explain interactions in dyads (Tanis & Postmes, in press ). SCT manages to transcend typologies of groups that exist "out there" by introducing and connecting the core features of those typologies within the psychology of the individual "in here". It explains why group members have the cognitive capacity to engage with others at different levels of social abstraction (individual, group, human) irrespective of the actual physical constraints imposed by group size, proximity and communication channels. Moreover, the fact that social identity and personal identity are products of social consensus provides a crucial link between cognition and interaction.
Implications for a Social Identity Perspective on Individuality
In this chapter we have argued that members of groups draw on interaction within the group partly in an effort to develop and change ideas of "who we are" (identity) and "what we are about" (purpose) and that these activities regulate and shape group members' self-conceptions and actions. These ideas, importantly, cannot be reduced to properties of the individual or to properties of the group.
They are carried forward and changed by individuals, but can only exist by virtue of some degree of consensualization within the group which creates a "social reality" outside of the individual (Haslam et al., 2003; Searle, 1995) . The approach in this chapter has been to define individuality as the perpetually unfinished product of this process: as a sense of identity that emerges within the group, and that is socially constructed through action and cognition, in which elements of both personal and social identity are represented.
There is actually a surprising amount of consensus about this issue among theorists coming from very different perspectives. Many have pointed out that the diachronic and interactive nature of the construction of identity in and from Interaction and identity formation 29 interaction invalidates or qualifies a static cognitive analysis of self and social categorization (Antaki et al., 1996; Billig, 1987; Moghaddam, this volume, Moreland, Levine, & McMinn, 2001; Oakes et al., 1994; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) . Whatever forms the analysis of this process may take, it is clear that social psychology needs to return to the study of groups in interaction in order to make progress on this front. Only in this way can we begin to understand the interaction between identities "out there" and "in here." For SCT, the study of small interactive groups remains not just the ultimate testing ground for its metatheoretical assumptions (cf. Turner et al., 1987, p. 88) , but one that can inform future elaboration of the theory.
Elsewhere we have presented a model of how social identities organically emerge through processes of induction, and are mechanically inferred through processes of deduction (Postmes et al., in press-a; in press-b) . In this chapter we elaborated this model, suggesting that personal identity may be constructed in similar ways. The model suggests that the group is not necessarily weakened by individuality (see also Hornsey & Jetten, 2004) . In fact, the results discussed above suggest that diversity can be a group's strength, rather than its weakness (e.g., Postmes et al., in press-b) . Most obviously, the emergence of interpersonal bonds can shore up the emergence of a superordinate solidarity. Moreover, if shared identity is the very basis for the emergence of individuality (Marx, 1857 (Marx, /1993 , then by implication any displays of distinctiveness can be interpreted as signs of (collective) trust and as emblems of in-group membership (Jetten et al., 2002) . In this way too, diversity may strengthen the group's ability for co-ordinated action, and enhance its efficacy and associated feelings of collective power (Durkheim, 1893 (Durkheim, /1984 .
The model also suggests that the content of personal and social identity are constructed in relation to each other. This implies that personal and social identity contents are not necessarily antagonistic, but can be mutually reinforcing (Baray et al., 2005) . Our research has shown that this antagonism is certainly not an issue in the content of particular identities (which may be more or less congruent and mutually dependent upon each other). Moreover, it is likely that cognitive salience is similarly affected by the processes of social identity construction that interaction continuously enables and requires.
Postscript: Theorizing social movements
At the start of this chapter we considered three social movements: Islamic fundamentalism, the reformation, and the first crusade. Revolving almost entirely around inter-group conflict, they are dominated by social identity concerns. The question we asked was: does individuality play any role in these movements? The chapter addressed the issue from several angles. We suggested that despite the many distinctions between large social movements, social categories, and small interactive groups, similar processes are found in all of them. We also presented research suggesting that small groups "dominated" by individuality can construct (induce) a social identity. Finally, we have shown that groups "dominated" by powerful social identities inform personal identity and individuality.
Interaction and identity formation 31 Putting these things together, the model of identity formation that we have presented suggests that socio-structural, economic and historical conditions play an important role in producing social movements, but that it is social consensus that gives them the influence that they have. The process of achieving consensus is not a mechanical one, and is closely bound up with the way in which social and personal identity are constructed in relation to each other, and with reference to the future. Consensus and identity do not simply exist "out there" (in society) or "in here" (in cognition). They are processes that organically emerge from ongoing interactions within and between groups. Invariably, autonomy and individuality play a key role in such interactions. Thus, our analysis of social movements (or groups in general, for that matter) should not just take into account sociostructural or cognitive processes, or personal or social identities. The key message of this chapter is that we can only understand the group if we study all these factors in conjunction, as they are expressed and formed in social interaction.
